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Abstract
Countries with strong executive constraints have lower growth volatility but similar average growth to
those with weak constraints. This paper argues that this may explain the relationship between executive
constraints and inows of foreign investment. It uses a a novel dataset of Dutch sector-level investments
between 1983 and 2012 to explore this issue. It formulates an economic model of investment and uses
data on the mean and variance of productivity growth to explain the relationship between investment
inows and executive constraints. The model can account for the aggregate change in inows when strong
executive constraints are adopted in terms of the reduction in the volatility in productivity growth. The
data and model together suggest a natural way of thinking about country-level heterogeneity in investment
inows following the adoption of strong executive constraints.
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1 Introduction
It is now universally acknowledged that political institutions play an important role in shaping patterns of
development and growth.1 Yet, knowledge about the implications of the specic mechanisms remains quite
modest and reduced-form correlations yield only limited insight into this. Hence an important part of the
research agenda on institutions and growth is to study specic channels of inuence and their associated
outcomes.
The e¤ect of institutions on investment is an important element of this research agenda. Here, we focus
on cross-border investment ows by multinational rms where data are available. Increases in cross-border
capital ows were a notable aspect of the recent era of globalization and the choice of countries for foreign
investment provides a potentially important channel for political institutions to have inuence. There are
good reasons to believe that political institutions will shape the risk/return prole that multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) face. According to several surveys among executives of MNEs, political risk is consistently
the single most important constraint for investment into developing countries over the medium term.2
This paper explores the link between the strength of executive constraints and foreign investment ows.
We explore the possibility that executive constraints encourage investment because they reduce the variance
of productivity shocks a¤ecting growth. We show that this is consistent with a political model where strong
executive constraints reduce the discretionary power of the executive. We argue that this is likely to lower
policy-induced volatility while the e¤ect on mean growth is ambiguous.
To explore this empirically, we use a panel of sector-level data on Dutch multinationals between 1983
and 2012 provided to us by the Dutch central bank. Although the data that we use are specic to one
country, namely the Netherlands, they are available for a reasonably long time period and cover countries
with a range of political institutions. The data are also disaggregated by sector. As a preliminary analysis,
we establish some raw facts and establish a robust reduced-form correlation between strong executive
constraints and foreign investment ows.
To explain these ndings we develop a model where executive constraints can lower politically induced
volatility by limiting policy discretion which, in turn, a¤ects investment incentives. We rst show that
this mechanism is reasonable as the adoption of strong executive constraints is indeed associated with
a reduction in the volatility of productivity growth.3 Based on the theory we then build a model of
expectations formation by investors. We propose that investors learn about expected productivity growth
and its volatility from observing the growth history of countries under strong and weak executive constraints.
A core element of the model is how much weight investors give to the experience of other countries when
evaluating the growth prospects of a country. We estimate the optimal weight on country-specic and global
experience based on the t of the model. When we bring this model of expectations formation to the data
1See, for example, North (1990), North and Thomas (1973), Acemoglu et al (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for
big picture discussions.
2These surveys are conducted by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank Group and have
between 100 and 500 respondants. For details see MIGA (2014).
3 It also shows up in measures of insurance risk rating and IMF growth forecasts.
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we nd that investment increases with expected productivity growth but falls with volatility.
Our model can be used to simulate counterfactual investment ows for countries that adopted strong
executive constraints. We show that the reduction in the variance of productivity growth can account for the
observed magnitude in the reduced-form relationship between investment inows and executive constraints.
However, there is considerable heterogeneity by country that would be missed by a standard di¤erence-in-
di¤erence approach. The reduction in the volatility of productivity shocks had a particularly large impact on
investment inows in some cases. For example, the estimates suggest that investment inows to Poland and
Argentina, for example, would have been less than half than what was observed had expected productivity
growth not become more stable after the adoption of strong executive constraints.
The sector-specic data allow us to explore the origins of the e¤ect. We show that sector heterogeneity
appears to be related to sector-specic political factors such as political connections or bribery by sector.
This suggests that something more than technological di¤erences are needed to think about why institutions
a¤ect sectors di¤erently. Our model points to the availability of rents as a key factor.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. We
then introduce the data and present some reduced-form evidence. Section four looks at a mechanism based
on specic theoretical approach. We then apply a specic model to explain the pattern of investment inows
among countries that adopted strong executive constraints over the period of our data. Section ve looks at
sectoral heterogeneity and nds a role for political factors in a sector while section six o¤ers some concluding
comments.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the large literature on democracy and economic performance such as Barro (1996),
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Persson and Tabellini (2009a,b), and Przeworski and Limongi (1993).
It is now generally recognized that there is no simple empirical story to be told and that there could be
considerable heterogeneity as discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2009b). Of more specic relevance are
those papers that have pointed out democracies are less volatile than non-democracies; see, for example,
Acemoglu et al (2003), Almeida and Ferraira, (2002), Mobarak (2005), and Weede (1996).
Also relevant to what we do is the literature on macro economic volatility in emerging economies. Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) observe that shocks to trend growth rather than transitory uctuations around a
stable trend are the primary source of uctuations in emerging markets. This observation is in line with
the idea that slow-moving political factors are behind growth trends.4 García-Cicco et al (2010) provide
evidence that the RBC model driven by productivity shocks does not provide an adequate explanation
of business cycles in emerging countries. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) separate growth volatility on the
country level from sector-specic volatility. They nd that, as countries develop, their productive structure
moves from more volatile to less volatile sectors and volatility of country-specic macroeconomic shocks
4We adopt their economic framework but, for simplicity, model volatility as a period-to-period variance.
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falls. Our ideas are also related to the observation by Calvo (1998) that "sudden stops" in capital ows
occur in countries because there is policy exibility; local governments are more constrained in their policy
choices creating less policy risk. This literature has not yet connected directly to that on changing political
institutions and the impact on volatility.
There is also a large literature which links institutions, measures of risk and foreign direct investment. In
the 1990s, most research on the inuence of policy-related variables on FDI ows consisted of international
cross-country studies. This found a negative link between institutional uncertainty and private investment
(Brunetti and Weder (1998)), a positive relationship between FDI and intellectual property protection (Lee
and Manseld (1996)), and a negative impact of corruption on FDI ows (Wei (2000)). Using di¤erent
econometric techniques and periods, Harms and Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003), and Busse (2004) nd that
multinational corporations are more likely to be attracted to democracies. Li and Resnick (2003) argue
that the location decision is inuenced by political risk.5 Alfaro et al (2008) show that there is a signicant
relationship between capital ows and a composite index of institutional quality in a variety of specications.
Jensen (2008) looks at the link between political risk and FDI. He runs cross-country regressions for a sample
132 countries nding a negative correlation between FDI and measures of risk. Jensen also nds that the
strength of executive constraints, in particular, is associated with lower political risk.
Exploiting panel data for 73 countries between 1995 and 1999, Egger and Winner (2005), nd evidence
of a positive correlation between corruption and FDI. They argue that, with high levels of regulation and
administrative controls, corruption may serve as a helping hand for FDI. Using a panel data set on 55
developing countries for the period 1987-95, Harms (2002) estimated the impact of nancial risk on equity
investment ows (i.e., the sum of FDI and portfolio investment) and found that lower nancial risk is
associated with an increase in FDI and portfolio investment. In similar vein, Gourio et al (2015) look at
the link between capital ows and stock markets for a sample of 26 emerging market economies with stock
market data nding that uncertainty in the form of stock market volatility is negatively related to capital
inows.
Papaioannou (2009) uses data on inter-bank lending to show that nancial ows increase when the po-
litical risk rating by the Political Risk Services (PRS) falls. This rating is a composite index that captures
a broad set of factors including ethnic tensions, corruption, and the political, legal, and bureaucratic insti-
tutions of a country. He uses both a long panel for 50 recipient countries and a cross-sectional IV strategy
to demonstrate the association between nancial ows and the risk rating. His IV estimates suggest that
a 10 point increase in institutional performance leads to a 60%-70% increase in inows. Kesternich and
Schnitzer (2010) consider how political risk impacts the rms choice of capital structure. Using data on
German multinationals, they nd that greater risk, as measured by the PRS, tends to increase leverage.
We make three main advances over prior work. First, we use a long panel of sector-level investments for
a large number of countries which allows us to exploit rare changes in political institutions while controlling
5A related literature looks at the impact of institutions on comparative advantage and, hence, trade ows. See Nunn and
Treer (forthcoming) for a literature overview.
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for a large set of country/sector xed e¤ects. The sector level data also allows us to illustrate that political
factors are at the heart of changes in inows. Second, we go beyond a reduced-form approach and explore
a specic mechanism working through a reduction in aggregate volatility. This link also provides a possible
explanation for the relationship between macro economic volatility and investment ows.
Finally, our work is related to work on the role of policy uncertainty for economic activity. Rodrik (1991)
argues that even low levels of policy risk about the implementation of reforms can prevent inow of foreign
capital into developing markets.6 Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) provide a measure of policy uncertainty
using news reports. They nd negative e¤ects of uncertainty for rms heavily exposed to government
contracts. In our paper, we posit that the absence of executive constraints may be a key driver of increased
risk and suppose that investors might learn from the experience of other countries with the same institutional
set-up.
3 Data and Preliminary Evidence
This section discusses the data that we use. It then looks at what the data suggest about the relationship
between political institutions and foreign investment using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach which exploits
within-country changes in institutions over time.
3.1 Data
Executive Constraints Much of the literature on political institutions and economic performance treats
democracy as an aggregate outcome based on the index in Polity IV. Here we use a disaggregated approach
motivated by the model presented below.
Our central focus is on institutions which constrain the use of power rather than those which allocate
power (such as elections). This focus has a venerable history. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835)
stressed the important role played by the judicial power in American democracy. He wrote regarding the
role of lawyers:
"When the American people allow themselves to be intoxicated by their passions, or abandon
themselves to the impetus of their ideas, jurists make them feel an almost invisible brake that
moderates and stops them." [p.309]
And John Stuart Mill (1859) described a limit to the power of a ruler that can be achieved through
"[...] establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of the community, or of a
body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some
of the more important acts of the governing power"
6Handley and Limao (2015) show that reduced uncertainty about future European trade policies can explain a large fraction
of growth in rm entry and sales of Portuguese rms.
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Our core measure of these constraints comes from the PolityIV variable xconst which is coded on a seven
point scale. Whereas the variable is quantitative, there is no reason to believe that each increment in the
index has equal importance. While it is ultimately an empirical question what cuto¤matters, there are good
reasons to suppose that it is only when the highest score is attained that constraints on the executive are
fully binding. The coders designate this a case where "(a)ccountability groups have e¤ective authority equal
to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity." (Polity IV, Coding Manual)7
We use a categorical variable denoting whether or not xconst = 7. This gives us 33 countries in our
time period which moved in and out of strong executive constraints. Examples of countries that changed
their constraints are Argentina, Thailand, South Africa, Turkey and Poland. Strong executive constraints
are reasonably rare in the Polity IV data; only 20% of country/year observations since 1950 have the highest
score for executive constraints which is much smaller than the group of countries that regularly hold contested
elections (around 50%). To validate this approach, it is interesting to see how a movement to xconst = 7
relates to other measures of political institutions which try to measure similar concepts. We nd that our
categorical variable is strongly correlated with the measure of checks and balances in Beck et al (2001) and
judicial independence, specically lifetime tenure for judges, in Melton and Ginsburg (2014).8
FDI Flows We focus on FDI ows as we have a source of available data which cover a range of countries
and long time-period.9 Our main data on FDI ows comes from De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) which
provided us with quarterly, sector-level data from 1983 to 2012 for a sample of more than 200 territories,
entities and countries. Since we are interested in the connection between foreign investment and political
institutions, we merge this data with the Polity IV dataset on political institutions by country. We are then
left with annual data on 156 countries between 1983 and 2012. As our dependent variable, we focus on gross
positive investment inows by multinationals to di¤erent countries.10 Details of this variable and other data
that we use are documented in the Appendix. Since we use sector level variation, we are able to include
country/sector xed e¤ects in our empirical specications.11
The main virtue of this data is the wide range of countries and the length of the time that it covers.12
There are su¢ cient numbers of institutional changes in executive constraints to be able to use within-country
variation.13 Other available datasets, for example those from UNCTAD or the OECD, have a similar range
7The checklist for coders in the Polity IV manual states that the highest score of the variable xconst is only allocated if
most important legislation is initiated by a parliament which holds the executive to account. Our reading of the country reports
is that those coding countries pay a lot of attention to whether the executive relied on support from another organization (this
could be, parliament, independent courts or the military) to conduct policy.
8The appendix discusses this in detail. We also provide examples of the motivation provided for recent coding changes in
Argentina and Turkey.
9The arguments that we develop apply to all forms of investment. However, we do not have reliable data on domestic country-
and sector-specic investment.
10We discuss this choice in the appendix. However, our results are robust to using net ows.
11All our results are robust to restricting the sample to the largest sectors. Note that of 21 sectors, the largest 15 sectors
account for more than 99 percent of all investment ows from the Netherlands over this period.
12This is an advantage stressed also by Poelhekke (2015) who uses similar data from the Dutch Central Bank.
13Coverage in the foreign direct investment dataset provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), for example,
is much lower - it covers about 1/3 of the country years in our dataset. This also means that coverage is sparse. Hungary and
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of coverage in terms of countries and years but do not disaggregate by sector. Since our data comes from
a single investing country, our focus is on variation in the characteristics of recipient countries. We do not,
however, have any detail on how investment ows are used and whether they are leveraged locally. Our
focus, therefore, di¤ers from that of the FDI literature which studies vertical and horizontal patterns of FDI
as an alternative to trade. We have not found a dataset with a wide coverage of countries and a long enough
time period to be able to look at the issues that we study using rm-level data.
3.2 Preliminary Evidence
Graphical Evidence To take a preliminary look at the data, Figure 1 plots the relationship between
strong executive constraints and mean investment ows for the period 1983-2012 distinguishing between
countries with and without strong executive constraints. It shows that countries with strong executive
constraints benetted much more from investment ows during the wave of globalization from the mid
1990s onward; mean yearly ows from the Netherlands into countries with strong executive constraints were
about 20 billion Euros towards the end of the 2000s compared with less than 2 billion in the sample with
weak executive constraints. Moreover, the increase in FDI ows outpaced GDP growth signicantly.
Figure 2 uses the same sub-samples of countries as shown in Figure 1 but now shows the average share
of global ows, as opposed to the average ows, attracted by countries with strong and weak executive
constraints. The average share in each category has been remarkably stable. In what follows we ask whether
countries systematically change their investment inows, controlling for sector/year xed e¤ects, i.e. we
control for changes in global ows depicted in Figure 2.
Regression Evidence The main outcome variable that we study is the gross investment inow in sector
s to country c in year t. This is a non-negative variable which takes on positive values with a large number
of zeros. Following recent work in the trade literature, we will use a xed-e¤ects Pseudo Poisson regression
model for investment ows.14 While Figure 1 showed that the overall level of global ows increased sig-
nicantly over time, it is important to identify the e¤ect of this separately from the general time trend in
investment ows. Hence, we include sector/year xed e¤ects.
Let ct 2 fS;Wg denote whether country c at time t has strong (S) or weak (W ) executive constraints
as dened above. From this we construct the indicator variable 
 (S) = 1 and 
 (W ) = 0 denoting which
political institution is in place. The core specication that we estimate for the sector-level data is
E fxsct : cs; st; ctg = exp (cs + st + 
 (ct)) (1)
where xsct is the inow of investment in sector s in country c in year t, cs are country/sector xed-e¤ects,
Poland, the only countries in Eeastern Europe that appear in the BEA dataset receive their rst ows in 1999.
14See page 645 of Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who argue that gravity equations can be estimated with the Pseudo Poisson
model (PML). We need country/sector xed e¤ects and sector/year xed e¤ects therefore face severe convergence problems
discussed at their webpage ("the log of gravity"). We therefore used the glm command in STATA to estimate our models and
cluster at the country level.
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st are sector/year xed- e¤ects. We will also look at country-level variation, i.e.
E fxct : c; t; ctg = exp (c + t + 
 (ct)) (2)
where xct is total investment in country c in year t, c are country xed-e¤ects and t are year xed-e¤ects.15
The identication of the e¤ect of strong executive constraints in all specications comes from variation
within countries over time. We control for almost 1750 country/sector xed e¤ects and 450 sector/year
xed e¤ects in (1) which reduces concerns about changes in sectoral composition driving our results at the
country level. This saturated specication is a good deal more cautious than most studies on the e¤ect of
institutions on economic outcomes. For our strategy to be credible, we require that there be no common
confounding factors driving both changes in institutions and investment ows. The fact that our estimates
barely change when we add di¤erent sets of economic or political controls is re-assuring in this regard. We
discuss robustness in detail below.
Table 1 gives the results. In columns (1) to (3) we display results at the sector level and in columns
(4) to (8) we display results at the country level. Reported standard errors are clustered at the country
level in all columns. Columns (1) and (4) present the core nding. The coe¢ cient on strong executive
constraints is statistically and economically signicant in line with Figures 1 and 2. Investment ows increase
by about 90 percent using sector-level variation and by about 82 percent using country-level variation
when strong executive constraints are adopted. Columns (2) and (5) show that it is strong executive
constraints rather than other measures of institutions that are correlated with investment inows. Unlike
strong executive constraints, there is no signicant correlation between high competitiveness and/or openness
of executive recruitment and investment ows as measured by the PolityIV data. These are the other
dimensions describing the executive that go into calculating country-level democracyscores.16 Our theory-
driven focus on executive constraints seems to be conrmed by this result. The similarity between the
sector-level and country total remains a feature of the results.
Columns (3) and (6) use the count of industries with inows as an alternative measure for investment
inows. This deals with the concern that the results are primarily driven by some large "outlier" values in
some sectors/countries. For this we rst measure investment inows in an industry as a dummy variable
that takes the value one if the investment inows are strictly positive in a given country/industry/year. We
then add these up to the sector level in column (3) and the country level in column (6). The positive and
similar coe¢ cient is interesting since it indicates that the previous results were not driven by changes at the
intensive margin alone (more ows in a given industry) but, also at the extensive margin (more industries
with inows).
Finally, columns (7) and (8) Table 1 look at two alternative data sources. Column (7) uses investment
15Changes in global ows are absorbed in sector/ year xed e¤ects in (1) and in year xed e¤ects in (2).
16For details see the Polity IV manual codebook. We also used a more exible specication with regard to the cut-o¤ on
executive constraints. This reveals quite clearly that it is the change from 6 to 7 which appears to be important for investment
inows. For a discussion see the previous section and the appendix.
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ows from all OECD countries provided by the OECD. Column (8) uses data provided by the UNCTAD
which measures ows at the destination country. The main nding is robust and the size of the coe¢ cient
is similar to that found in column (4), 52 and 39 percent respectively.
The results reported in Table 1 are robust to controlling for political reforms of capital restrictions
and trade barriers, EU membership and even eight di¤erent variables to capture political turmoil. Unlike
executive constraints, variables such population or GDP per capita have no predictive power. This is di¤erent
to other studies like Alfaro et al (2008) who rely on cross-sectional variation. Our results are also robust to
controlling for natural resource trade as well as health and human capital measures. For a detailed discussion
of robustness see the online Appendix and Tables A2a, A2b, A3, A4 and A5.17
It is also worth noting that inows change rapidly, without any discernible pre-trend, following the
adoption of strong executive constraints. Figure 3 illustrates this by looking at the dynamic consequences
for investment of adopting strong executive constraints. The graph reports the results of a regression of
investment ows on the strong constraints dummy and the adoption year dummy with 4 leads and lags.18
The graph demonstrates that the e¤ect of adopting strong executive constraints is discrete albeit with a one
year lag. Thus, investment inows seem to respond one year after the change at a permanently higher level
thereafter. The theoretical model developed in the next section is consistent with such a level e¤ect.19
4 Exploring a Mechanism
This section develops a specic theoretical model and explores its implications. We begin by laying out a
theoretical model and then show how it can be brought to the data.
4.1 Theory
The Economy Consider an open economy with a xed number of sectors indexed by i and where i be
the number of rms in sector i. We study the behavior of a representative rm in each sector where, for
convenience, set the price of each sectors output to be one. A sectors labor productivity has a time-invariant
rm-specic component, i, and a time-varying country-specic component,  t. The latter is assumed to
depend on country-level economic policies along the lines articulated by Aghion and Howitt (2006) and
evolves stochastically over time according to
 t =  t 1ept
17We have explored the possibility of endogeneity by following Persson and Tabellini (2009b) who suggest that foreign De-
mocratic Capitalcould be important in sustaining institutional change. To implement this idea, we use a two-stage procedure
where we rst predict the adoption of strong executive constraints by using the adoption of such constraints in neighboring
countries. This exercise, the results from which are reported in appendix Table A5, is discussed in the online appendix and
yields similar results.
18See Table A1 in the online Appendix. Figure 3a uses results in column (1) and Figure 3b uses results in column (2). Figure
A2 shows the same graph for UNCTAD investment inows.
19The level e¤ect is also realistic as investment ows in our data includes items such as credit to subsidiaries or asset purchases.
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where pt = + "t with the stochastic time-varying shock to productivity growth being normally distributed,
i.e. "t  N

 2"2 ; "

.20 In the next subsection, we present a simple model of the political process in which
 and " depend on whether a country has weak or strong executive constraints.
Output in the representative rm in sector i is given by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yit =

( tiLit)
K1 it

where  < 1. This is a Lucas (1978) "span of control" model of rm level heterogeneity where pure prot is
a return to owning a specic technology.
Firms hire capital and labor in competitive factor markets. However, we assume a di¤erence in timing
between labor and capital decisions. Capital is installed before "t is realized while labor is chosen after-
wards.21 The labor market is closed with a xed stock of labor L. The capital market is open with inows of
capital into foreign owned rms representing investment and the global cost of capital is r.22 We show in the
appendix that this yields the following expression for per capita output which depends only on exogenous
variables:
yt = B  ( t) (E [( t)])
(1 )(1 )
1 +(1 )2 (3)
where B is a time-invariant constant. The level of output now depends on the realized period t productivity
shock and the ex ante mean and variance of productivity shocks since these a¤ect the incentive to invest.
Since we have assumed that the productivity shocks caused by the political environment are exogenous,
equation (3) allows us to separate the direct e¤ect of productivity shocks working through [ t]
 from the
indirect e¤ect of inhibited capital accumulation working through E[( t)
].
Politics The role of executive constraints is to curtail instances of bad policy making in the spirit of the
veto players model of Tsebelis (2002).23 We think of this as achieved through the actions of a legislature
which can reduce the discretion of the executive if it is inclined to act against the general interest of the
citizens.24 As above, let ct 2 fW;Sg denote whether a country has strong or weak executive constraints
at date t. With weak executive constraints, policy is determined solely by the executive while with strong
executive constraints a legislature also inuences policy as outlined below.
20This implies that E (e"t) = 1.
21This is a key assumption and is tantamount to assuming that ex post adjustment costs are very high. Risk would not
matter in our framework if capital could be chosen exibly and costlessly adjusted after "t becomes known. The model could
be complicated by assuming adjustment costs which would lead to option value in investment as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
22This theoretical approach could be applied to domestic and foreign owned rms alike. For foreign owned rms, the
assumption that r is exogenous is, however, more plausible. It would be straightforward, although tedious, to separately model
the domestic and foreign-owned sectors of the economy.
23The theoretical approach is further developed in Besley and Mueller (2014). It is based on ideas in the political agency
literature rst developed in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). Besley (2006) o¤ers a review of the main ideas.
24As an example for a lack of constraints take the situation in Zimbabwe in 2001 where, after a stand-o¤ with the executive,
Anthony Gubbay, Zimbabwes Chief Justice surrendered to government demands on the 2nd of March and agreed to relinquish
o¢ ce. In a Wikileaks cable, an US diplomat had described the independence of the judiciary as the "last check on president
Mugabes exercise of untrammeled power."
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To map politics directly onto our economic model above, suppose that productivity growth pt depends
on policy making represented by a parameter t which varies stochastically depending of the behavior of
policy-makers. While we do not model the micro-foundations of policy making, we have in mind a range of
policies that could drive growth along the lines of Aghion and Howitt (2006). The expected productivity
growth trend introduced in the previous section is now
 () = E [t : ] :
As before we have productivity growth given by pt =  () + "t but the error is now "t = [t    () + !t]:
This error consists of an iid shock !t with mean  
2
"()
2 and variance 
2
! and political risk induced by the
di¤erence t    (). Accordingly, the variance of productivity around its trend is:
2" () = var (t : ) + 
2
!:
Thus political institutions a¤ect productivity growth through the mean and variance of t. We now suggest
a simple micro foundation for why executive constraints inuence policies t.
No Executive Constraints ( = W ): In this case, the quality of decision making by the executive
alone determines productivity growth. For simplicity, suppose that t 2 fL;Hg with H > L. The
probability of H depends on the e¤ectiveness of the executive with  denoting the probability that the
executive is produces H . The parameter  could be interpreted either as a measure of competence or as
reecting the extent to which there the incumbent is susceptible to rent-seeking inuence.25 Then:
 (W ) = H + (1  ) L
and
2" (W ) =  (1  ) [H  L]2 + 2!.
In this case, it is  which a¤ects both  (W ) and 2" (W ) directly. A higher value of  due, for example, to a
greater availability of political rents, increases the trend rate of productivity growth but has an ambiguous
e¤ect on its variance.
Executive Constraints ( = S): Here we suppose, following coding practice in the data, that a
legislature also has a say in making policy. Specically, it can veto any proposal by the executive and impose
a policy which yields 0 2 [L;H ]. One interpretation of this is as maintaining a status quo rather than
allowing policy activism and rent extraction.26 The key assumption is that this has a moderating inuence
25 In Besley and Mueller (2014), we develop a model based on rent-seeking by incumbents.
26This in the spirit of Tsebelis (2002) who argues that having more veto players increases status quo bias in political systems.
Note, also that this model is consistent with the ideas in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) who argue that economic rents can be
an impedement to economically benecial reforms if they ow towards the politically powerful.
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since the payo¤ of this policy lies between the bad and good outcomes achieved under pure executive
discretion.
We model the imposition of this default outcome in a reduced-form way, supposing that 0 is imposed
with probability J (J 2 fL;Hg) when the executive would have generated growth of J . If H > 0,
the constraint results in discretion sometimes being removed even when the outcome would have been H .
However, if L > 0, the legislature can prevent a policy error that would have resulted in a payo¤ of L.
Thus the pair fH ; Lg represent the competence of the legislature.
Now dene:
~J = [(1  J) J + J0] :
Using this, the key model parameters determining productivity growth are:
 (S) =  ~H + (1  ) ~L
and
2" (W ) =  (1  )
h
~H   ~L
i2
+ 2!.
Comparing this to the case without executive constraints, these parameters now depend not only on the
available political rents, , but also the competence of the legislature fH ; Lg and the quality of the default
policy 0.27
Empirical Implications We now develop two implications of the theory. The rst is a prediction about
productivity growth across political regimes and the second concerns the impact on investment. For pro-
ductivity growth and volatility we have:
Lemma 1 Trend productivity growth may be higher or lower with strong executive constraints, i.e.
 (S)><  (W ) as H [0  H ] + (1  )L [0  L]>< 0
The variance of the productivity shocks "t is unambiguously lower under strong executive constraints, i.e.
2" (S) < 
2
" (W ).
The mean e¤ect depends on whether the constraints predominantly allow good executive discretion and
eliminate bad use of discretionary policy. However, the reduction in the variance holds regardless of this as
long as the default policy induces moderation, i.e. 0 2 [L;H ]. If executive constraints always impose
the default H = L = 1 then productivity growth  (S) = 0 always and the model features no volatility
due to policy. The model has, as another special case, a perfectionist view of executive constraints in which
H = 0 and L = 1. In this case the outcome L is replaced by 0 under strong executive constraints.
28
27 In Besley and Mueller (2014),  is derived as an endogenous variable and also varies with executive constraints.
28The key assumption that drives the comparison of the variances is that 0 2 [L;H ], i.e. that the legislature can never
make things worse by vetoing what the executive does and can never improve on a good executive by intervening.
12
We now use this comparison to derive implications for investment with and without executive constraints.
The optimal capital stock, and hence investment, at the rm level depends on the expected productivity
growth and its volatility. Investors should therefore react to changes in these. Following the evidence above,
we are interested in understanding the implications for foreign owned rms and hence investment. But if
we had good domestic rm data or sector specic data, this too could be used.29 We will now state the
empirical prediction specically to emphasize the link to the data.
We show in the appendix that the optimal capital stock for rm i is given by
lnKit () = lnCi  
(1  )2 
2 (1   + (1  )2)
2
" () (4)
+
 (1  )
1   + (1  )2 () + + ln (( t 1)
)
1 
1 +[1 ]2
where Ci is a sector-specic constant. Equation (4) shows that investment incentives follow the deep para-
meters of the productivity growth process  () and 2" (). In this way, changes in the political institutions
t 2 fW;Sg have a direct implication for investments given by:
Proposition 1 The optimal capital stock of foreign rms is increasing in  () and decreasing in 2" () :
Thus, the model predicts that investment will respond to changes in

 () ; 2" ()
	
. This gives an
immediate link to the reduced-form ndings above where we found that inows of investment were higher
under strong executive constraints. However, since Lemma 1 shows that  () can increase or decrease under
strong executive constraints, the overall prediction for investment from the adoption of executive constraints
using the theoretical model is ambiguous.
Proposition 1 motivates trying to decompose the outcome into an e¤ect coming through mean produc-
tivity growth  () and its variance 2" (). To that end, we will rst estimate  () and 
2
" () from aggregate
growth data. We show in the Appendix, that mean output growth, ^g (), and the variance of growth ^
2
g ()
can be used to derive estimates of the productivity parameters

^ () ; ^2" ()
	
from:
^ () =
1   + 

^g () +
1  2 + 22
2 ()2
^2g () (5)
and
^2" () =

^g ()

2
: (6)
In the following section we will use the estimated parameters

^ () ; ^2" ()
	
from equations (5) and (6) to
explain investment inows motivated by (4). This will allow us to decompose the e¤ect of adopting strong
executive constraints into an e¤ect operating through a change in trend growth,  (), and a change in the
variance of productivity shocks, 2" (). In line with Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we will see whether the
29This underlines the benet of having accurate data on investment at the sector-level for a large number of countries and
years.
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variance reduction can explain the reduced form nding in the previous section.
4.2 Evidence
Executive Constraints and Growth Table 2 shows that there are strong empirical regularities in the
relationship between growth volatility and executive constraints. Panel A gives summary statistics for real
GDP per capita growth from the Penn World Tables di¤erentiated according to whether a country has strong
or weak executive constraints. The rst part of the table summarizes the raw data for the full sample of
countries between 1970 and 2010. The sample of country/year observations with strong executive constraints
grew by 2.2 percent on average while the sample with weak executive constraints grew by 1.9 percent on
average. This di¤erence in average growth between the two groups is negligible and is not statistically
signicant. There is, however, a large di¤erence in the second moments between the two groups. The
variance of growth is roughly 3.5 times higher in the sample of countries with weak executive constraints
and the di¤erence is statistically signicant at 5%.30 This observation is consistent with the prediction in
Lemma 1.
The second part of Table 2, panel A shows that this di¤erence across regimes based on variation in polit-
ical institutions is not driven purely by cross-sectional di¤erences in growth. This observation is important
in light of the well-known fact that poorer countries, which tend to have weak executive constraints, also
have more volatile growth rates.31 If we restrict the sample to those countries that spent at least ve years
in both strong and weak executive constraints between 1970 and 2010, the same basic picture emerges of a
similar level of growth along with lower variance when strong executive constraints are introduced.
The evidence in Table 2 suggests that a change from strong to weak executive constraints induces a
mean preserving spread in growth rates. Figure 4 depicts this by plotting Kernel densities for growth rates
under strong and weak executive constraints. The distribution of growth rates is approximately normal.
The more extreme outcomes (high and low) under weak executive constraints are clearly visible. The share
of country/year observations with a negative growth rate under weak executive constraints is 32 percent
but only 22 percent under strong executive constraints despite very similar average growth rates. Prima
facie, this nding gives credence to the idea that we might explain the regression results above as being due
to a reduction in the volatility of productivity growth. If investors understand this relationship, we should
expect investment to be higher when volatility is lower.32
Equations (5) and (6) allow us to move from the mean and variance of growth to the parameters which
a¤ect investment in theory. To illustrate, we use these equations and the growth summary statistics in Table
2, Panel A to produce estimates of

^ () ; ^2" ()
	
in Panel B. We need to postulate values of  and  for
30The F statistics of the test in the full sample is F = 3.8.
31See, for example, Koren and Tenreryo (2007).
32 In appendix Table A6 we show that this is not unrealistic. First, the evaluation of political country risk by a public risk
insurer (ONDD) seems to fall with the adoption of strong executive constraints. Second, IMF forecasts become less volatile
with the adoption of strong executive constraints. It is re-assuring that the mean of these forecasts does not change.
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this purpose and we set  = 23 with  =
3
4 .
33 Unsurprisingly, in light of (6), our observation on the variance
of growth maps into a prediction about ^2" (). The variance under weak executive constraints is about four
times higher than the variance under strong executive constraints.
Updating Our theory suggests that investors will form expectations about

^ () ; ^2" ()
	
to guide their
decisions. It is reasonable to suppose such expectations to be informed by country-specic as well as world-
wide experiences of growth under strong and weak constraints.34 If a country has never been in strong
executive constraints, then we need to assign a reasonable expectation about  () and 2" () after the
change takes place. One option would be to base this on the average past global experience or it could try to
take the country-specic experience into account. After some experience with strong executive constraints,
we might expect that a countrys growth experience will become salient to investors rather than only using
the average experience of all countries in the world.
We approach this issue empirically by building a Bayesian model of expectations formation for beliefs
about trend productivity growth and its variance across political regimes. We use this model not to forecast
ows but to show that our model leads naturally to a treatment e¤ectfrom strong executive constraints
which is heterogenous with respect to both the timing of the change and the countrys experience. To give
a concrete example, the East Asian crisis of the mid-1990s is in our time period. The timing of a countrys
transition in executive constraints might therefore depend on whether it occurred before ot after the crisis
as beliefs about the benets from strong executive constraints changed. Moreover, some countries may have
experienced greater reductions in growth volatility compared to their time under weak executive constraints.
The procedure for computing f^ct () ; ^"ct ()g has two steps. First, we use standard updating formulae
for evolving expectations of ^2g () and ^g () in the light of fresh information on growth outcomes. Second,
we use these estimates to calculate the parameters of productivity growth using equations (5) and (6).
Suppose that a country has a single transition in our data period.35 When country c transitions at time
 (c) we use growth data between 1970 and time  (c) from all countries to construct the following data
moments:
G1 (;  (c)) = ^g (;  (c)) and G
2 (;  (c)) = ^2g (;  (c)) + ^
2
g (;  (c)) .
Then, as growth in the country is observed we we can write the updated expectation of mean growth as
^gct (;  (c) ; D) =
D G1 (;  (c)) +
tP
s=(c)
gcs ()
D + t   (c)
where  (c) is the year in which the country transitioned into regime  2 [S;W ]. The parameter D gives the
33Changing these assumptions in a reasonable interval does not change our results much.
34This idea is similar in spirit to Buera et al (2011) which studies the di¤usion of policy across nations as a learning process.
35The same basic approach can be used to form in expectations when there are multiple institutional transitions. In such cases,
we assume investors recall what happened previously in a particular institutional regime. Our results are all robust whether or
not we include countries with multiple transitions.
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strength of the prior which comes from the growth history of all other countries. For this, we use observations
of growth for all countries in a given regime between 1970 and the relevant transition date.36 A higher value
of D means that more weight is given to the growth history of other countries with the same institutions.
Importantly, the longer a country is in a regime, i.e. the higher t    (c), the more weight is put on the
particular growth history of the country. If D = 10, for example, it takes a decade under the new regime
until half the weight is placed on the particular experience of the country. Below, we will use a goodness of
t criterion to select the best value of D to explain investment.
Analogously, we assume that foreign investors form beliefs about the volatility of a country through
^2gct (;  (c) ; D) =
(D + t   (c))
"
D G2 (;  (c)) +
tP
s=(c)
[gcs ()]
2
#
 
"
D G1 (;  (c)) +
tP
s=(c)
gcs ()
#2
(D + t   (c)  1) (D + t   (c))
using the standard formula for updating the sample variance of a normally distributed variable.37
To construct the predicted mean and variance as a function of institutions, we use ^gct (;  (c) ; D) and
^2gct (;  (c) ; D) from the updating formulas to calculate productivity growth given by our economic model
^ct =
1   + 

^gct +
1  2 + 22
2 ()2
^2gct; (7)
^2"ct =
^2gct
()2
: (8)
This approach to modelling expectations is implicitly allowing for a country-specic relationship between
an institutional transition since it is based on the regime-specic growth history of each country. Countries
which implement strong executive constraints after experiencing large growth swings are expected to benet
more from the adoption while countries which experience a rapid decline in growth after the adoption will
experience a slow reduction of inows. As both equations (7) and (8) are functions of D the updating model
depends on how much weight is given to the prior. In the following section we will try to learn form the
actually observed behavior and choose the D which describes the investment data best.
Empirical Results Figure 5 gives a rst impression of how the model helps to understand the investment
ow patterns in the data. On the y-axis we show log average inows for those countries that switched
regime in our sample. At the same time, the gure shows the country/episode average of the estimates of
^2"ct for  = W in red and for  = S in blue. The fall of the expected variance with the adoption of strong
executive constraints is clearly visible. All observations in strong executive constraints are to the left of
36We use residuals of a regression of growth on country xed e¤ects. The main implication of using residuals is that changes
in mean growth with the regime are calculated from the within-country variation, i.e. after taking out a country-specic growth
mean. Using raw growth data makes no qualitative di¤erence to our results.
37So see this set D = 0 which gives the standard sample variance formula ^2ct (; 0) =
(t (c))
tP
s=(c)
g2cs() 
24 tP
s=(c)
gcs()
352
(t (c) 1)(t (c)) :
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observations under weak executive constraints. At the same time inows increase so that the general move
in a north-westerly direction is clearly visible.
In addition, the heterogeneity in country experiences is also apparent from Figure 5. What is particularly
interesting here is that there are large di¤erences in the variance beliefs under weak executive constraints.
In the case of Nicaragua and Lesotho high volatility was accompanied by particularly low average inows.
In order to test the model in a more systematic way we now run regressions where instead of including
strong executive constraints directly, we use our estimates of trend productivity growth and the variance of
productivity as a conduit for such constraints to a¤ect outcomes. The sector-level specication is:
E

xsct : cs; ^
2
"ct; ^ct; yct
	
= exp
 
cs + st + 1
 
^2"ct

+ 2 (^ct)

(9)
where xsct is the inow of investment in sector s in country c in year t. We will also look at specications
where we use the total ow at the country level, i.e.
E

xct : cs; ^
2
"ct; ^ct; yct
	
= exp
 
c + t + 1
 
^2"ct

+ 2 (^ct)

(10)
where xct is the inow of investment in country c in year t. In both of these specications, we expect 1 < 0
and 2 > 0.
As discussed in the previous section the variables ^2"ct and ^ct are functions of D. In order to nd the
D that describes the investment data best we run the regressions in (9) and (10) repeatedly and report a
standard goodness of t measure for a GLM model, namely the deviance.38 The result is reported in Figure
6. Deviance falls rapidly with larger values of D in both the sector and country level. After a value of
D = 40 both deviance curves start to atten and we get minimum deviance for D = 46 using country-level
variation and D = 68 using sector-level variation. This implies that investors put quite a lot of weight on
the experiences of other countries when evaluating the impact of institutional changes.
Table 3 present estimates of our updating model at the sector and country level using minimum deviance
estimates of D above. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 contain our main results. The results show a strong
negative relationship between investment and expected volatility and a strong positive relationship between
investment and expected trend growth. In columns (2) and (5) we show results for the full sample, including
countries that did not switch institutions. Again, we get the expected signs of ^1 < 0 and ^2 > 0. This
is somewhat re-assuring as it indicates that the model is able to describe the investment data even if most
observations come from countries that did not switch regime. In columns (3) and (6) we control for the
covariance of productivity growth between the Netherlands and the respective country. We nd a negative
coe¢ cient, as one would expect from portfolio choices of rms in the Netherlands, although it is somewhat
imprecisely estimated.
We can examine how well the approach reported in Table 3 does relative to a reduced-form model of
38This is given by 2
P fxsct log(xsct=x^sct)  (xsct   x^sct)g where x^sct are the tted values from equation (9) or (10).
17
Table 1 using a likelihood ratio test. This shows that the are substantial gains in explanatory power using
the results reported in Table 3. To illustrate this nding, Figure 7 plots the kernel densities of the average
prediction errors for countries which change their executive constraints. The model in equation (10) produces
prediction errors which are, on average, much closer to zero.39
The results in Table 3 suggest that a reduction of expected volatility of 0.01 is accompanied by an increase
in investment inows of around 100 percent which, from Figure 6, is broadly in line with the reduction induced
by a change in the prior when a country switches from weak to strong executive constraints. This e¤ect
is coming from the learning from other countries and explains the rather sudden increase in investments
inows depicted in Figure 3. Another way to understand the magnitudes is to go back to equation (7) and
think about the impact of the expected growth rate, ^gct. Our assumptions imply that
1 +
 = 1:5 so
that an increase of mean growth, ^gct, by half a percentage point, for example, would imply that investment
inows increase by 75 percent.
The Heterogeneous E¤ect of Institutional Transitions The main advantage of tting a specic
model to the data compared to the di¤erence-in-di¤erence results is that we can gain an insight into hetero-
geneous e¤ects across countries from institutional changes based on a specic mechanism. To do this, we can
exploit both time-series and cross-sectional variation in

^gct; ^
2
gct
	
. Countries have benetted di¤erentially
from adopting strong constraints depending on their own particular reduction in policy risk and the e¤ect
this had on subsequent investment ows.
To illustrate the importance of heterogeneity across countries, we show how our model can be used to
account for changes in investment inows for each country according to their specic experience.
We construct counterfactuals in which we imagine that the adoption of strong executive constraints did
not change either the mean or the standard deviation of growth. To be more precise, our counterfactual
assumes that investors do not understand that they are in a new regime and keep updating on old beliefs.
This has two e¤ects. First, the priors do not shift in the adoption year. This is particularly important for the
expected variance, ^2gct. Secondly, the new growth data receives a much smaller weight.
40 We then compare
these counterfactuals to the actual values of the tted model to gain an estimate of the investment ow due
to the path of

^gct; ^
2
gct
	
taken by a country according to our model. This gives us an estimate of the
change in investment ows which can be attributed to the changing mean and variance for each country.
Table 4 column (1) gives the average yearly investment inows during the episode of strong executive
constraints for each country that changed institutions over our time period. Flows varied signicantly
between countries with those in Eastern Europe experiencing gross yearly inows of more than three billion
EUR per year. To generate the predicted ows in column (2), we use the estimates from Table 3, column
39This suggests that the regression model from our preliminary look at the evidence can over- or under-estimate average
inows in some countries by signicant margin. We show in Appendix Figure A3 that the reduced form model understimates
ows in Europe and it overestimates inows into Asia (by over 200 million Euros on average).
40A country that switches after twenty years of being in weak executive constraints, for example, will give a weight of 1=67
to the new observation instead of 1=47 (assuming D = 46).
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(4). The tted values reported in column (2) predict the country experience reasonably well.41
Columns (3) and (5) report two estimates of how the trend and variance in productivity growth matter
for each country. In column (3), we predict investment inows supposing that the prior in ^gct had not
changed when strong executive constraints were introduced. For each country this gives a counterfactual
investment inow holding all other inuences, including the growth history, on investment xed. We can
then compare this to the prediction based on the actual path of ^gct that we have calculated for each country.
In column (5) we do something similar holding the prior in the variance of productivity growth xed as our
counterfactual. Heterogeneity across countries in these estimates is now dependent on a countrys growth
history and its e¤ect on

^gct; ^
2
gct
	
.42
Column (4) looks at mean growth, ^gct by comparing columns (2) and (3). It reports the log di¤erence
between inows with and without the country-specic change in trend growth. There is a wide range of
estimates. For example, our estimate for Argentina suggests that the decline in trend growth in Argentina
reduced investment inows by about 22 percent compared to the counterfactual. Column (4) also illus-
trates why the impact of strong executive constraints through mean growth is fairly small on average. A
similar number of countries have positive and negative experiences with some seeing improved and others
deteriorating growth after adopting strong executive constraints. On average, the mean e¤ect of adoption is
relatively close to zero which is in line with the average growth e¤ect. However, the numbers indicate quite
a dramatic degree of heterogeneity across countries.
Column (6) reports the implications of changes in the variance of growth, ^2gct, by comparing columns
(2) and (5). The counterfactual is now the adoption of strong executive constraints without a shift in priors
at the adoption date. The estimates are now uniformly positive, illustrating that the reduction in ^2gct led to
an increase in investment inows in all countries which adopted strong executive constraints in our data. In
some countries the counterfactual suggests a very large impact of the variance reduction. For example, we
predict that yearly gross investment ows into Poland would have been about 3 billion EUR less per year
if strong executive constraints had not lowered the expected variance of productivity growth. According
to our model, Turkey would have experienced a reduction of gross investment inows by over 400 million
EUR per year without the shift in variance beliefs. Many more countries from all regions of the world are
estimated to have benetted massively from the reduction of growth volatility.
Table 4 underlines the heterogeneity in country-level experiences from adopting strong executive con-
straints.43 This is consistent with Lemma 1 which emphasizes that the impact on mean growth depends on
whether the constraints predominantly curtail misused discretionary policy decisions either due to incom-
41 If we run a linear OLS regression of actual and tted FDI ows for both strong and weak executive constraints we get an
adjusted R-squared of 0.72.
42An important subtlety is that more weight goes into a countrys growth history regime when the prior changes because the
previous growth history is disgarded.
43Table A7 in the on line appendix, shows clearly di¤erent patterns across continents. The adoption of strong executive
constraints is associated with lower growth in all continents with exception of Europe and especially in Asian countries. At the
same time, reductions in volatility have been larger in Africa and Europe than in Asia and Latin America. Not surprisingly,
these di¤erences also lead to di¤erent changes in inows with adoption.
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petence or rent-seeking by incumbents. Of course, adopting strong executive constraints can backre if the
executive is competent and/or if the legislative or judicial powers are used unwisely. But the pattern that
we nd is consistent with the idea that as veto players, their limit on discretion and, hence, rent-seeking has
a positive e¤ect on investment inows by reducing political volatility.
While forcing the e¤ect of institutions to work through trend productivity growth and the volatility of
productivity growth is limiting, the model does a reasonably good job at explaining heterogeneity across
countries and predicts an overall impact of a change from weak to strong executive constraints of around 140
percentage points in investment inows which is similar in magnitude to what we found in the reduced-form
approach. The results in Table 4 also illustrate the importance of decomposing the e¤ects country by
country and into those due to changes in the mean and volatility of productivity growth. These are masked
by the average e¤ects from a reduced-form di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach.
5 Sectoral Heterogeneity
So far, we have not considered sectoral heterogeneity. However, our data make it possible to investigate
whether there are di¤erences in responses of investment ows to executive constraints across sectors More-
over, there is scope to see how this varies according to political factors which a¤ect the sector. Having rst
established that there is some heterogeneity, we present suggestive evidence that politics may be behind
this. Finally, we show that this is also consistent with how volatility di¤erentially a¤ects sectoral investment
ows.
As a preliminary, we run a regression of the form in equation (1) but allowing a di¤erent relationship with
executive constraints in each of our 15 sectors.44 The coe¢ cients, ordered by the point estimate, along with
the 95% condence intervals are reported in Figure 8. There is a clear evidence of sectoral heterogeneity.
Moreover, most service sectors are towards the left of the graph, i.e. have small/insignicant e¤ects, while
heavy industries and the most other heavily regulated service sectors, such as nance, are towards the right.
Manufacturing, which is the largest sector in our data, has a precisely estimated coe¢ cient towards the
middle of the range.
We next explore whether the heterogeneity displayed in Figure 8 is related to political factors which
vary by sector using two di¤erent measures. The rst is the Index of Bribery in Business Sectors from
Transparency International. This is a sector score on a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 indicates that the sector
is less prone to bribe-giving. A limitation of this is that we only have a measure of this on average across
countries rather than country-specic variation. After including country/sector xed e¤ects and sector/year
xed e¤ects we interact the executive constraints dummy variable with this bribery index to see whether
most of the e¤ect comes from sectors which tend to pay most bribes. Since giving bribes relates to the
extent of rent extraction by the government, we expect more exposure to bribery to be associated with
44 In this regression we drop the remaining sectors as they capture less than 1 percent of ows and are identied by much
fewer observations.
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larger benets from the adoption of executive constraints. In Figure 9 we show that this does seem to be
the case. The Figure reports the coe¢ cients from Figure 8 and contrasts them with the bribery score from
Transparency International.45 Table 5, column (1) conrms the relationship with a simple dummy that
separates the eight sectors in bribing and non-bringing sectors. Inows in bribing sectors react almost twice
as much to the adoption of strong executive constraints than in non-bribing sectors.
We can also look at heterogeneity in political factors using data from Faccio (2006) which reports on
political connections in 35 countries for 18 of our sectors.46 Politically connected rms benet from ties to
the government which could impose costs to outsiders (such as foreign investors) thereby deterring them
from investing. To the extent that strong executive constraints limit policies enacted for private political
gain, then there will be a more level playing eld for foreign rms after executive constraints are adopted
leading to larger increases in investment ows in sectors with political connections. We can use the data
in Faccio (2006) to classify a sector in a given country as politically connectedif at least one rm in the
sector is classied has being politically connected. This yields about one third of all sectors being classied as
politically connected on this basis. In line with our expectations, column (2) of Table 5 shows that, controlling
for country/sector xed e¤ects and sector/year xed e¤ects, politically connected sectors respond more to
adopting strong executive constraints. Strikingly, this is still true if we control for country/year xed e¤ects
instead of sector/year xed e¤ects, i.e. there is a relative change of inows towards sectors which have strong
internal political connections.47
Our nal investigation looks at heterogeneity in the way productivity shocks a¤ect a sector. Here, we
allow for a sector-specic relationship between the variables (7) and (8) and investment ows. Although,
this approach leads to less precisely estimated coe¢ cients, all of the signicant sector-specic coe¢ cients
on ^2"ct are negative and all of the signicant sector-specic coe¢ cients on ^ct are positive.
48 Moreover, we
nd a similar relationship between politics and heterogeneity to that found using a reduced-form approach.
Specically, the sector which is most responsive to volatility, as measured by ^2"ct; is construction. While the
lack of precision means that this evidence should only be regarded as suggestive, we do nd an ordering of
the coe¢ cients on ^2"ct that matches with the transparency international index of bribe-giving by sector.
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Hence, overall the sectoral-level patterns are consistent with the broad approach taken here emphasizing the
role of politics and productivity shocks.50
45See the Appendix for a discussion of matching the scores to sectors. We were not able to nd matches for the remaining
sectors.
46See also Fisman (2001) and Desai and Olofsgaard (2011).
47 In order to control for the fact that some countries might have more connected rms overall we also interact the measure
with the share of rms in each country which are in the respective sector. Results are reported in Table A8. The higher the
share, the higher are the changes in inows with the adoption of strong executive constraints.
48Results are reported in Appendix Table A9.
49See Appendix Figure A4.
50A further concern is that politically connected sector may di¤er in other characteristics, for example average rm size, and
that this may be driving the result. We do not have direct measure of rm size in our data. However, we looked at this in US
data as a benchmark and nd that there is no clear relationship between the average rm or establishment size in the US and
the reaction of inows to the adoption of strong executive constraints. For example, electricity, gas and steam is a clear outlier
in terms of establishment and rm size but towards the middle in Figure 8.
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6 Concluding Comments
Much of the literature on the importance of political institutions for economic outcomes is not specic about
the mechanism at work. Having observed a robust reduced-form relationship between investment inows
and strong executive constraints, we have suggested a specic approach based on the observation that there
is a robust link between strong executive constraints and reduced volatility in country-level growth rates.
This motivates our focus on an economic channel working through risk and investment incentives where
capital is committed before productivity shocks are realized. Our model provides a natural way of thinking
about the heterogeneous relationship between institutions and foreign investment ows.
Our approach postulates that institutions matter because government policy matters for the productivity
of investment. At the core of the model is the idea that institutional constraints on the executive limit policy
discretion. This will be benecial if either there is a general increase in the competence when responsibilities
are shared or because possibilities for rent-extraction which distorts policy is reduced.
Certain features of the data seem to be captured by the approach that we take. We have found that
inows in the aggregate increase when strong executive constraints are adopted and that this increase in
inows is associated consistently with the reduction in volatility which follows. A model based on changing
in beliefs about volatility following a change in institutions does a good job at capturing the heterogeneous
e¤ect across countries. We have also shown that, consistent with a model where political distortions are
linked to incumbent rent-seeking, sectors which are most prone to rent extraction, experience the strongest
increase in inows after the adoption of constraints and react most strongly to our measure of volatility. All
of this is consistent with the fact that many enterprises also report concerns about political risk in survey
data. Together, these pieces suggest that a model based on discretionary rent-seeking which leads to greater
economic volatility, as outlined above, provides a fruitful way of describing these patterns in the data and
the reason why strong executive constraints matter.
The inclusion of a range of country, time and sector xed e¤ects means the paper is extremely cautious in
its approach to identication and is able to control for many sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Our results
lend support to the idea that countries can avoid downside risks and thereby attract foreign investment.
In the long run, this could lead to the signicant cross-sectional di¤erences in income and investment ows
that we see between countries with strong and weak executive constraints.
Our focus on investment ows by foreign rms comes purely from the fact that we have good data
for Dutch multinationals for a range of countries which have reformed their political institutions over the
relevant time period. It would be interesting in future to test the ideas developed here for domestic rms
where we would expect similar ndings. However, this would require identifying data of comparable quality
to that which is available to study FDI ows.
More generally, the results developed here o¤er a specic take on debates about the causes and conse-
quences of political risk. Modern approaches to economic growth such as Aghion and Howitt (2006) have
argued persuasively that the policy environment for growth is of rst-order importance. An important role
for political institutions can be to provide predictability in that policy environment for rms, thereby reduc-
ing policy risk. The benets of checks and balances then go beyond mean comparisons and suggest a role for
the impact of institutions on volatility. While investment is only one window on the economic consequences
22
of this, discussions of risk are paramount in such cases. Moreover, there is a wider set of concerns about
how policy risk due to weak institutions can have economic consequences at the micro level and which merit
further investigation.
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A The Economic Model
We rst derive the formula for the prot maximizing capital stock. The representative form in sector i
chooses its labor demand to maximize

( tiLit)
K1 it
   wtLit
This yields
Lit = Yit

wt
so that in the aggregate it needs to hold that
wt = Yt

L
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Plugging Lit into the rms production function
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and plugging in wt implies for aggregate output
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and plugging this back into the rm-level production function
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using the above equation, the rm-level expected prot function is
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which implies that the capital stock follows expected output according to
Kit = (1  ) E [Yit]
r
:
Now to complete the solution. Note that expected rm-level output is
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We now use this to solve for K^t:
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Inserting this back into the output equation implies that per capita output moves according to
yt = B [ t]
 (E [( t)
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where B is a constant.
B Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The variance of "t with strong executive constraints variance can be written as:
 (1  ) [(1  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L) L]2 + 2!
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This variance is lower than under weak executive constraints since:
H  L > (1  H) H   (1 + L) L
as claimed. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: Using the results above, we know that the rm level capital stock is given by:
Kit =
(1  ) 
r
E [( t)
]
1 
1  

1 
i

(1  ) 
r
 (1 )
1 
[L]
(1 )
1 

K^t
  
1 
=
[1  ] 
r
E [( t)
]
1 
1  

1 
i

(1  ) 
r
 [1 ]
1 
[L]
(1 )
1 

0@(1  ) 
r
 (1 )(1 )
1 +[1 ]2
E [( t)
]
(1 )(1 )
1 +[1 ]2 L
(1 )(1 )
1 +[1 ]2
X
i

1 
i
 (1 )(1 )
1 +[1 ]2
1A 

1 
Gathering terms related to E [( t)
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which implies immediately that the optimal capital stock is increasing in  and decreasing in 2" as claimed.

C Productivity Growth and GDP per Capita Growth
In order to get an expression for mean growth we insert
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which we can combine with
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D Data
D.1 Political Institutions
Summary statistics are in Table A0. We use data on political institutions from three sources. Our main
source is data on political institutions from the Polity IV data base whose manual is available at users
manual for the Polity IV dataset available from the website http://www.systemicpeace.org/. We recoded
all negative values in xropen, xrcomp and xconst to 0. Excluding these values instead has no impact on
our main estimates.
Openness of executive recruitment is the variable xropen which is intended to capture the extent to which
the politically active population has an opportunity to attain the position through a regularized process.
This is on a four point scale. At one extreme a value of one denotes the most closed possibility where
chief executives are determined by hereditary succession and includes kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc. A
score of four (maximal openness) denotes the case where chief executives are chosen by elite designation,
competitive election, or transitional arrangements that fall between designation and election.
Competitiveness of executive recruitment is the variable xrcomp which tries to capture the to which
"prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates". The
lowest score of one denotes the case where chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, desig-
nation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. The
highest score of three goes to countries where chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive
elections matching two or more major parties or candidates.
The executive constraints variable that we use is xconst available on a seven point scale. The manual
explains the variables construction as follows:
"Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision
making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be
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imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures.
Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles
or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a
strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between
the various parts of the decision-making process."
There is a value of one where there is unlimited authority in which there are no regular limitations on
the executives actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and
assassinations) and category seven is executive parity or subordination where accountability groups have
e¤ective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. We construct a dummy for
executive constraints as there is no reason to believe that e¤ects on investments will be linear in xconst. We
use a cut-o¤ of xconst = 7 as this is the only level at which another entity becomes completely autonomous
and therefore poses a very immediate constraint on the executive. This ts our theory of what executive
constraints are best. We discuss robustness below. Appendix Figure A1 shows the share of countries with
a score of xconst equal to 7. The share went from around 0.25 in the 1980s to over 0.35 in 2010.
Given the still relatively broad denition of xconst it is useful to think about what institutional changes
underly these changes over time. The perhaps best way to understand the coding decisions is to look at the
arguments explaining the coding decisions. Argentina was set from xconst = 6 to xconst = 7 in 2015. The
justication in the list of changes, available from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html is:
In elections held on 25 October 2015, opposition candidate Mauricio Macri forced a runo¤
ballot held on 22 November 2015. Macri narrowly defeated the Justicialist candidate and was
inaugurated on 10 December 2015. He is the rst non-Peronist president to be elected since 1916.
He faces a congress controlled by the Justicialists.
In 2014 constraints in Turkey were coded xconst = 4 down from xconst = 7 in the previous year. This
change took place amongst other coding changes in the same year. Still, the elements involved in determining
the level of executive constraints are still clear from the following explanation:
There seems little doubt about the political interests and aspirations of Recep Tayyip Er-
do¼gan, the founder and leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey. Having
voiced his desire to alter the constitution to make Turkey a presidential system, he has accom-
plished an unquestioned concentration of authority and has secured the o¢ ce of the president on
28 August 2014; he has not been able to secure the support needed to change the constitution,
however. His subsequent actions, then, indicate that he intends to act as though he has that legal
authority, or doesnt need it to exercise that authority. Either way, this "pattern of authority"
is consistent with a usurpation of power that is not vested in his elected o¢ ce, that is, an auto-
coup. His use of government levers to restrict both the media and the opposition to ensure his
presidential bid and his manipulation of ethnic-tensions to negate an unfavorable parliamentary
outcome and ensure a more favorable subsequent outcome are indicative of restrictions placed
on executive and general competition and a sharp diminution of executive constraints.
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As an additional check on our measure of executive constraints we use two alternatives. The rst measure
is a measure of checks and balances which comes from Beck et al (2001). The measure, checks_lax, is based
on the number of checks on the executive (See Keefer and Stasavage(2003) for a discussion). While positively
correlated with the measure based on xconst, the measure is based on a rather di¤erent procedure. Crucially,
the variable only codes the power and composition of the legislature when coding checks and balances. If
judicial control is important this is an important di¤erence between the two measures. Also, the composition
of parliament receives much more weight than the constitutional rules which govern the interplay between
legislature and executive.
One attempt in coding de jure institutions which govern judicial independence is provided by Melton
and Ginsburg (2014) who try to capture the independence of the highest ordinary court in each country
by coding several dimensions of the selection, recruitment and retainment of judges from constitutional
provisions, i.e. they focus on de jure provisions. In this they focus on six dimensions: statements of judicial
independence, judicial lifetime tenure, selection procedures, removal procedure, limited removal conditions
and salary insulation.
It can be shown that both the count of checks on the executive and the dummy for judicial tenure are
both strongly correlated with our main measure of executive constraints even when we control for country
and time xed e¤ects. The association with xconst is much weaker. One plausible explanation is that the
(rare) occasions in which countries adopt tenure for judges in the top court are cases in which the court is
able to impose meaningful constraints on the executive. Following this interpretation, we use the number of
checks on the executive and the dummy for judicial tenure to run robustness checks.
D.2 Investment Inows
Our investment data comes from the Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). The denition of
Investment Inows used by the Bank in this period comes from the IMF Best Practice Manual 5.0. According
to this denition direct investments are transactions relating to movements in share capital by foreign-owned
enterprises, i.e. equity participations which are conducted with a lasting interest. The lasting interest is
dened through the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and
a signicant degree of inuence by the investor on the management of the enterprise.
Investment inows in our data consists of three di¤erent investment ows: equity capital, reinvested
earnings and other capital ows. Debt and equity are reported directly by reporting agents. Reinvested
earnings is calculated by the Dutch Central Bank as the di¤erence between resultin nancial year (which
is reported) and dividend in nancial year (which is also reported). Equity and reinvested earnings are both
direct results of capital investments (shareholdersequity). Other capital contains all other intercompany
ows, mainly loans.
A special feature of the Dutch data is that it contains regular entities and special purpose entities (SPEs).
In fact, more than half the investment ows we observe in our sample of countries comes from SPEs. An SPE
is a legal entity that is created to fulll narrow, specic or temporary objectives. This serves two purposes.
First, SPEs are used by companies to isolate the rm from nancial risk. Normally a company will transfer
assets to the SPE for management or use the SPE to nance a large project thereby achieving a narrow set
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of goals without putting the entire rm at risk. Secondly, SPEs are also used to hide debt (inating prots),
hide ownership, and obscure relationships between di¤erent entities which are in fact related to each other.
In order to reduce the impact of the second motivation on our estimation we excluded tax havens and very
small countries with less than 100,000 inhabitants.
We have data at the industry level but aggregate the data into sectors to avoid having too many zeros.
We also run robustness checks with the largest 15 sectors which contain more than 99% of all the FDI
conducted from the Netherlands.
We focus on gross inows for most of this study as this generates a number which is either zero or
strictly positive. It is important to keep in mind that, on the sector level at least, the investment data is
often dominated by sudden and large ows. Including outows would force us to produce a dataset with more
zeros, we would have 25% fewer ows in the data. However, in order to provide a sense of net inows we also
study positive net inows. For this we calculate the net inow and set it equal to 0 in country/sector/years
in which it is negative. Since results are robust and even the size of the coe¢ cient is similar, we are condent
that what we capture are investment ows. In addition, we study whether a country/sector had any inow
at all in a given year in order to make sure that outliers do not play an essential role.
In order to be sure that our results are not driven by particularities of the Dutch data we gathered
investment ow data on the country level from the OECD web page. Again we focus on gross ows into
"partner" countries from all OECD countries and add across all OECD countries. We were able to match
data for 158 countries between 1985 and 2012. We also used data from the UNCTAD FDI ows dataset
which gives inows in millions of dollars and comes from the UNCTAD World Investment Reports. We
match data for 157 countries between 1983 and 2012. We always replace negative observations by zeros.
D.3 Other Data
D.3.1 Growth, GDP and Population
Growth and real GDP data is from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 7.0 and is based on the rgdpl
variable. Growth is the percentage points increase from one year to the next. Population and openness are
also from PWT 7.0.
D.3.2 ONDD
Political risk is from the Belgian insurer O¢ ce National du Ducroire (ONDD). ONDD insures international
transactions like credit and foreign direct investments against political risk like political violence or expro-
priation. Its insurance rates are linked to publicly available country ratings of political risk published on the
ONDD web site. We use their numbers for short term and mid-term credit risks as these are available from
1994 till 2010. ONDD analysts meet four times a year to update the country risk ratings. Each country is
reviewed at least once a year in one of the four quarterly meetings based on the countrys geographic region.
Countries that are not in the region under review can be added to the agenda in cases of political change
that requires a reevaluation. Ratings go from 1 (low risk) to 7 (high risk). Columns (1) and (2) in Table
1 show that an increase of risk by one point corresponds to a decrease in foreign investment by around 10
percent. These categories are used to generate the prices charged for political risk insurance.
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D.3.3 ICRG
Information on property rights protection is taken from the International Country Risk Guide. (ICRG) pro-
vided by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. Since 1984, PRS Group (2005a) has provided information
on 12 risk indicators that address not only political risk but also various components of political institutions.
We use their measure of risk of expropriation which is coded between 0 and 10 with higher scores implying
better protection.
D.3.4 Bribery Measures by Sector
We use the bribe-giving scores by sector from the 2011 Transparency International report. This Index is an
average of the answers to three questions in the Bribe Payers Survey. Business executives around the world
were asked How often do rms in each sector: a) engage in bribery of low-level public o¢ cials, for example to
speed up administrative processes and/or facilitate the granting of licenses?; b) use improper contributions
to high-ranking politicians or political parties to achieve inuence?; and c) pay or receive bribes from other
private rms? Sectors are scored on a scale of 0-10, where a maximum score of 10 corresponds with the
view that companies in that sector never bribe and a 0 corresponds with the view that they always do. We
match as many sectors as possible to sectors in our data. This can mean that we can match more than one
sector. For example, in manufacturing we can match "light" and "heavy" manufacturing. In those cases we
take the average.
D.3.5 Political Connections
We use two measures for connected sectors. Our main measures is from Faccio (2006) who assembled a
database of 20,202 publicly traded rms in 47 countries. A company is identied as being connected with a
politician if at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting shares) or
one of its top o¢ cers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a
minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party. We mark a sector as connected if at least one rm
in the sector is politically connected in a given country.
To match rms we typed each rms name on the search engine of the website Credit Risk Monitor
(www.crmz.com). Whenever a rm is available on this websites dataset, it will show its NAICS classication
(most often, more than 1 sector is identied for each rm). In case a rm is not available on Credit Risk
Monitor, we use Bloomberg Business search engine and read the rms prole to identify the sector(s).
In case a rm is not available on either CRM or Bloomberg we used other sources. For this, we did a
standard google search of a rms name and looked for a website that provides the information. Of course,
the accuracy in identifying the correct sector(s) in this situation can potentially decrease. Using this method
we could match data for 32 countries and 19 sectors.
As a second measure we use the share of all rms that are active in the respective sectore. This mea-
sure is particularly tailored to the specication with country/year xed e¤ects as here only the relative
connectedness of the sector should matter. This seems to indeed be the case.
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Online Appendix
E Additional Empirical Results
E.1 Dynamics Around the Adoption Date (Table A1)
Table A1 reports the coe¢ cients of investment ows on lags and forwards of the adoption time and a dummy
for strong executive constraints. We use these coe¢ cients in Figures 3a) and 3b). Figure 3a uses results in
column (1) and Figure 3b uses results in column (2). Note, that starting in the adoption year, the coe¢ cient
from the dummy "strong executive constraints" needs to be added to the coe¢ cients to reveal the overall
e¤ect on ows.
E.2 Robustness (Tables A2a, A2b, A3 and A4)
We now discuss the robustness of the results presented in the Preliminary Evidence section. We present
robustness checks at the sector level in Table A2a) and for the country level in Table A2b). In columns
(1) we control for standard economic controls GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth and population (all
from the Penn World Tables 7.0). The estimated coe¢ cients are robust to these controls. Importantly, none
of the controls is signicantly related to foreign investment ows. This is a stark contrast to cross-sectional
studies of investment and trade ows which cannot control for sector/country or country xed e¤ects.
In the respective columns (2) we expand the list of economic controls by the share of fuels and ores
and metals as a percentage of exported merchandize. These control for the relative importance of natural
resources. We also add life expectancy as an additional measure for economic development.51 All these
measures are from the World Bank. Again, results are robust to the inclusion of these controls and there is,
if anything, only a weak relationship between controls and investment inows. Given that economic controls
reduce the sample size and are endogenous we therefore exclude them from our main specications.
In columns (3) of Tables A2a) and A2b), we include the ICRG measure of property rights protection
which is frequently used to capture the consequences of institutions. This variable is available for a shorter
time period than our main data. However, it does represent one specic risk that foreign investors may
care about. The result in column (1) suggests that stronger property rights protection does indeed have
a positive association with investment inows. However, including this variable does not change the core
nding that there is a signicant positive correlation between investment and strong executive constraints.
So the ICRG variable seems not to be catch-all for all formal institutional changes in this context. In fact,
with its inclusion, the coe¢ cient on strong executive constraints barely changes when compared to columns
(1) and (4) of Table 1.
In columns (4) and (5) of Tables A2a) and A2b) we control for several measures of external openness.
51Results are also robust if we aggregate our data on investment and executive constraints to 5 year periods and then include
years of schooling from the Barro and Lee dataset as a control. This counters the claim that strong executive constraints may
simply be serving as a proxy for omitted human capital. See the discussion in Glaeser et al (2007).
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In column (4) we control of the level of openness according to the Penn World Tables and a dummy for EU
members. The motivation for the latter is that inows changes dramatically with the adoption of strong
executive constraints in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of these countries also became EU members
around the same time. In column (5) we introduce as additional controls two reform index from Giuliano et
al (2013) who argue that democratisations lead to a urry of economic reforms. They provide a new dataset
on reforms in the nancial and capital sectors and trade for 150 countries over the period 19602004. Both
these indexes have a strong and signicant e¤ect on inows. However, this does, at the very least, not
seem to be the only e¤ect of executive constraints as they maintain their strong and signicant e¤ect on
investment ows.
Columns (6) add a battery of political outcomes which could be correlated with strong executive con-
straints but which are more direct measures of political disruption. These include assassinations, strikes,
guerilla warfare, major government crises, purges, riots and revolutions and anti-government demonstra-
tions from the Banks and Wilson (2016) data set. Interestingly, anti-government demonstrations are the
only variable which is negatively and signicantly associated with investment inows.
Table A3 present some additional robustness for the sector level in panel A and the country level in
panel B. In the rst two columns, we use two di¤erent measures which are trying to capture the same
ideas as executive constraints. The rst of these is the checks and balances variable from Beck et al (2001).
Our second measure of (judicial) constraints is a dummy which captures whether institutions which govern
judicial independence. This measure is provided by Melton and Ginsburg (2014). For a detailed discussion
of these variables see the main Appendix. Both are positively correlated with our measure of investment
ows. In column (3), we look at exclusively at the post cold war period (i.e. after 1991) and show that
the results are robust. In column (4) we use the net rather than gross investment inow. Results, even
magnitudes are fairly robust. And nally in column (5), we put in the total FDI inow as the exposure
variable in the regression. This is a less demanding specication compared to xed e¤ects. Interestingly,
the magnitude of the coe¢ cient changes only slightly.
In Table A4 we report the estimated coe¢ cients if we split the di¤erent categories of xconst into dummies
and introduce them into the same regression. We do this for our main measure of ows and for the count
of industries with inows and at the sector and country level. The omitted category in this regression are
the values 0 and 1 (excluding the 0 vaues has no impact on the results) . The top line in the table shows
that there is a clear positive e¤ect of having xconst = 7 compared to the omitted category. There is no
consistent pattern for any other value of xconst.
E.3 The Two Stage Procedure (Table A5)
In this section we describe a two-stage procedure for estimating the impact of strong executive constraints
on foreign investment ows. In the rst stage we predict the adoption of strong executive constraints
through the share of neighboring countries that adopted strong executive constraints. The idea is based on
Persson and Tabellini (2009b) that the adoption of democratic institutions in countries leads to a build-up
of democratic capital in other countries. We use a linear xed e¤ects regression to produce tted values
of strong executive constraints. The results are reported in Table A5, column (1) and indicate that the
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probability of having strong executive constraints increases by 44 percentage points if all neighbours have
also adopted it.
In Columns (2) to (5) we use the tted value from this regression in regressions as in Table 1, Panel B.
The identifying assumption now is that the adoption of strong executive constraints in neighboring countries
does not a¤ect foreign investment other than through the adoption decision. It is clear that the coe¢ cient
on strong executive constraints increases somewhat over the simple reduced form results. We now estimate
that investment inows more than double with the adoption of strong executive constraints. We also nd
much bigger e¤ects for the diversication of the economy.
While it is promising that the results are robust, an issue with this instrument is that it is hard to pick
up the precise the timing of changes in institutions which matters as can be seen from Figure 3.
E.4 Evidence on Changes in Beliefs (Table A6)
In Table A5 we focus on the sample of countries that changed level of executive constraints between high
and low executive constraints at least once. First, we check whether the adoption of executive constraints
coincides with a fall of political risk as produced by the insurance industry. We collected data on political risk
evaluations from the Belgian insurer Delcredere Ducroire (ONDD) who, according to their annual report,
insured transactions worth about 7 billion EUR in 2011. The variable we use measures the risk of a credit
default for reasons beyond the control of the debtor, i.e. due to political or nancial macroeconomic events.
We choose this variable because it provides the longest time-series. ONDD measures both short- and mid-
term risk on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 7 (high risk).52 Table A6, columns (1) to (3) show that, in the
countries which switched regime, risk is reduced. In column (3) we show that this is not a general feature
of political institutions as captured by the Polity IV data but specic to executive constraints.
As a second measure we look at the forecasts from the IMF World Economic Outlook which is published
since 1990 and includes GDP per capita forecasts for the two preceding years and ve years ahead. This
can be thought of as capturing the beliefs of IMF o¢ cials about the outlook. For example, in 1990 the IMF
provided GDP forecasts for the years 1988-1995 for each country. From these forecasts we calculate for every
year and country in the IMF data the mean growth and variance of growth implied by these forecasts. Table
A6 shows that the variance of growth falls with the adoption of strong executive constraints (columns (4) to
(6)) while the mean growth forecast does not (columns (7) to (9)). This particularly re-assuring as it links
the adoption of strong executive constraints directly to public beliefs held by the market in the respective
year. From columns (6) and (9) we see that, again, this is not a general feature of political institutions as
captured by the Polity IV data but specic to executive constraints.
52We use their short-termrisk measure. Results are similar to using the mid-termrisk measure instead.
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E.5 Continent Heterogeneity (Table A7)
After running the model and generating the estimates fdmnctd; varctg for each country/year we rst aggregated
to country/regime level and calculated the change that occurs on average with a switch between regimes.
Table A7 reports the average di¤erence between weak and strong executive constraints for each continent.
The Table shows clearly di¤erent patterns across continents. The adoption of strong executive constraints
is associated with lower growth in all continents with exception of Europe and especially in Asian countries.
At the same time, reductions in volatility have been much larger in Africa and Europe than in Asia and
Latin America. In other words, Table A7 shows that there is some heterogeneity by continent behind what
is reported in Table 2, Panel A.
E.6 Share of Politically Connected Firms per Sector (Table A8)
In Table A8 we check whether our results are robust to looking at the share of connected rms in each
sector (relative to all politically connected rms in the country). This view is complementary with the
country/year e¤ects, i.e. we are interested in whether relative ows increase in sectors that contain a larger
share of politically connected rms. Indeed, our results are robust to looking at this as Table A8 shows.
E.7 Sector Heterogeneity (Table A9)
In Table A9 we show results where we allow for a sector-specic relationship between investment ows and
the variables dened in equations (7) and (8). Although, this approach leads to less precisely estimated
coe¢ cients, all of the signicant sector-specic coe¢ cients on ^2"ct are negative and all of the signicant
sector-specic coe¢ cients on ^ct are positive.
E.8 Appendix Figures (Figures A1-A4)
Figure A1 shows the share of countries which have adopted strong executive constraints. Note, that this
gure is both driven by countries appearing and disappearing and adoptions.
Figure A2 shows the Figure for global investment ows from UNCTAD around the adoption of strong
executive constraints. The Figure is equivalent to Figure 3 and only uses di¤erent data on the left-hand-side.
Figure A3 displays the mean of the linear errors in the reduced form model estimated in Table 1, Column
4 and the updating model estimated in Table 3, Column 4. Errors are calculated by comparing the actual
change inows from weak to strong executive constraints to the tted values in the two models. The average
error is reported on the y-axis. Negative numbers mean that inows are underastimated by the model.
Figure A4 reports coe¢ cients from Table A8 which are signicant at 90% condence together with scores
from the Bribery in Business Sectors report by Transparency international. Higher scores mean that the
sector is less prone to bribe giving.
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Table 1: Executive Constraints and Foreign Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Number of 
Industries with 
Inflows
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Number of 
Industries with 
Inflows
Investment 
Inflow         
(OECD)
Investment 
Inflow         
(UNCTAD)
strong executive constraints 0.902*** 0.912*** 0.349*** 0.787*** 0.821*** 0.334*** 0.521** 0.392***
(0.297) (0.303) (0.0911) (0.301) (0.307) (0.0903) (0.217) (0.124)
high openness -0.0538 -0.112
(0.179) (0.184)
high competitiveness 0.237 0.284
(0.313) (0.334)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes yes no no no no no
sector/year fixed effects yes yes yes no no no no no
country fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 45,937 45,937 46,846 4,469 4,469 4,581 4,347 4,621
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns report results from a fixed effects poisson regression. Dependant variable is the 
gross investment inflow from the Netherlands into the country or country/sector except for in columns (3) and (6). Columns (3) and (6) use the number of industries 
with a positive inflow. Dependant variable is the flow of investment from all OECD countries in column (7) and from all countries in column (8). All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year.
sector level country level
Table 2: Executive Constraints and Growth (1970-2010)
Panel A: GDP per Capita Growth Data
Sample Constraints Obs Mean Variance
strong executive 
constraints
1676 0.022 0.0019
weak executive 
constraints
4002 0.019 0.0069
strong executive 
constraints
534 0.023 0.0019
weak executive 
constraints
811 0.021 0.0062
Panel B: Calculated Productivity Growth (assuming alpha=0.66 and eta=0.75)
Sample Constraints Obs Mean Variance
strong executive 
constraints
1676 0.040 0.0076
weak executive 
constraints
4002 0.046 0.0281
strong executive 
constraints
534 0.042 0.0077
weak executive 
constraints
811 0.047 0.0255
whole sample
countries  with at 
least five years in 
strong and weak 
executive constraints
whole sample
countries  with at 
least five years in 
strong and weak 
executive constraints
Notes: Units are country/years. Sample are all countries between 1970-2010. Growth is GDP per 
capita growth (not in percent).
Table 3: Inspecting the Mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
variance of productivity growth 
(estimated on country level) -134.1*** -91.64*** -122.3*** -119.3*** -75.81*** -108.9***
(37.34) (32.41) (32.03) (32.92) (28.34) (29.87)
mean productivity growth            
(estimated on country level) 117.0*** 98.13*** 103.0*** 102.0*** 96.20*** 90.28***
(35.20) (34.77) (28.46) (24.42) (27.29) (20.92)
covariance of productivity 
growth with Netherlands -143.1 -150.8
(91.89) (95.63)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes yes no no no
sector/year fixed effects yes yes yes no no no
country fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 36,118 9,244 9,178 3,780 898 892
country levelsector level
Investment Inflow
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All columns report results from a 
fixed effects poisson regression. Dependant variable is the gross investment inflow from the Netherlands into the country or 
country/sector. The table uses D=68  in columns (1) - (3) and D=46  in columns (4) to (6). Columns (1) and (4) use the entire sample. 
Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) use just the sample of switchers. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Table 4: Counterfactual FDI Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(I) (II) ln(II)-ln( I) (III) ln(III)-ln( I)
country
mean yearly 
investment inflows
fitted value of 
investment inflows
simulated fitted value 
of investment inflows
effect of change in 
mean on inflow
simulated fitted value 
of investment inflows
effect of change in 
variance on inflow
Albania 98054 99674 44437 81% 12789 205%
Argentina 263381 163135 203923 -22% 42034 136%
Bolivia 87754 82215 165995 -70% 33229 91%
Botswana 11837 12474 53984 -147% 1558 208%
Bulgaria 348508 333506 2032526 -181% 137342 89%
Chile 622376 630490 154564 141% 141843 149%
Colombia 290534 123328 153083 -22% 24751 161%
Croatia 644454 657542 156185 144% 122877 168%
Ecuador 74176 80816 304607 -133% 23082 125%
Greece 1068985 1072056 1786512 -51% 374068 105%
Haiti 1834 4899 5376 -9% 613 208%
Hungary 2399784 2362905 5813608 -90% 867742 100%
Kenya 138391 189025 159539 17% 41440 152%
Lesotho 1542 1477 1100 29% 146 232%
Madagascar 13450 3876 4552 -16% 773 161%
Mongolia 487 469 1094 -85% 127 131%
Nicaragua 11651 13514 5089 98% 949 266%
Niger 101 26711 18734 35% 3327 208%
Nigeria 30278 17817 26473 -40% 2418 200%
Pakistan 27859 35546 45643 -25% 10087 126%
Paraguay 26633 27905 127999 -152% 7484 132%
Peru 157474 251577 147503 53% 44483 173%
Philippines 20730 121345 109810 10% 23770 163%
Poland 3943650 3953977 2014290 67% 927219 145%
Romania 3768022 3458702 2277528 42% 485955 196%
Serbia and Montenegro 0 162056 78528 72% 25968 183%
Slovakia 1285825 1276911 965403 28% 359683 127%
South Africa 1261258 1279585 1390801 -8% 1040161 21%
Sudan 13 58987 45089 27% 11268 166%
Taiwan 1610792 1555414 2481339 -47% 330926 155%
Thailand 654031 494277 1910636 -135% 142608 124%
Turkey 1473559 806766 1003502 -22% 402992 69%
Uruguay 202042 788108 496157 46% 287266 101%
AVERAGE: -11% AVERAGE: 151%
adoption of strong constraints without 
change in mean productivity growth
adoption of strong constraints without 
change in variance of productivity growth
Notes: All inflows are average yearly inflows during strong executive constraints (in 1000 EUR). "mean yearly investment inflows" is the actualy average 
yearly inflow of investment into the country. "fitted value of investment inflows" is the fitted value from Table 3, Column (5). "simulated fitted value of 
investment inflows" replaces the expected mean growth (in (II)) and the expected variance of growth (in (III)) in the episode with strong executive 
constraints with the respective values without updating the prior. The difference between (I) and (II) (or (I) and (III) respecitvely) captures the effect of 
changing priors in the new regime through the expected mean (variance) on investment inflows in the model.
Table 5: Rent Seeking, Executive Constraints and Investment Inflows
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
strong executive constraints 0.906*** -0.0203
(0.111) (0.167)
strong executive constraints * 
bribing sector 0.846**
(0.375)
strong executive constraints * 
politically connected sector 0.584** 1.898***
(0.237) (0.366)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes yes
sector/year fixed effects yes yes no
country/year fixed effects no no yes
Observations 27,109 13,240 13,240
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
columns report results from a fixed effects poisson regression. Dependant 
variable  is the gross investment inflow from the Netherlands into the 
country/sector. Bribing sector is defined through the bribe giving index from 
transparency international. We take the score from the latest (2011) report and 
average across all industries which we can match to sectors in our data. The 
sectors with a score higher than the median are coded "bribing sectors". 
Political connection is from Faccio (2006). We first match firms in this data to 
our sectors and then use a dummy which indicates that a firm in the sector is 
coded a politically connected by Faccio (2006).
Table A0: Summary Statistics
Sample for Reduced Form (1983-2012)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI inflow (in million EUR) 45,923 398.480 4601.665 0 235695
Number of Industries with 
Inflows 45,923 0.465 0.499 0 1
strong executive constraints 
(executive constraints=7) 45,923 0.386 0.487 0 1
high openness 45,923 0.813 0.390 0 1
high competitiveness 45,923 0.510 0.500 0 1
politically connected sector 
(Faccio (2006)) 28,025 0.407 0.491 0 1
bribe taking score (transparency 
international) 13,240 0.264 0.441 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI inflow (in Million EUR) 9,231 45.29 265.05 0 8468
world level estimates
updating model estimates, D=68
variance of productivity growth 
(estimated on country level) 9,231 0.0157 0.0081 0.0067 0.0352
mean productivity growth             
(estimated on country level) 9,231 0.0059 0.0064 -0.0070 0.0252
updating model estimates, D=46
variance of productivity growth 
(estimated on country level) 9,231 0.0153 0.0081 0.0062 0.0388
mean productivity growth             
(estimated on country level) 9,231 0.0056 0.0070 -0.0117 0.0291
Sample for Mechanism Section (1983-2010, Only Countries that Switched)
Table A1: Dynamic View Around the Adoption Date
(1) (2)
sector level country level
VARIABLES Investment Inflow Investment Inflow
strong executive constraints 0.838*** 0.725***
(0.325) (0.270)
4 years before switch -0.183 0.112
(0.352) (0.376)
3 years before switch -0.639*** -0.460**
(0.214) (0.194)
2 years before switch -0.322 -0.215
(0.245) (0.215)
1 year before switch -0.184 -0.304*
(0.232) (0.183)
year of switch -1.040*** -1.108***
(0.250) (0.239)
1 year after switch -0.103 -0.185
(0.327) (0.299)
2 years after switch -0.339* -0.453**
(0.181) (0.204)
3 years after switch -0.376* -0.408
(0.213) (0.278)
4 years after switch -0.334 -0.338
(0.267) (0.324)
country/sector fixed effects yes no
year/sector yes no
country fixed effects no yes
year fixed effects no yes
Observations 32,211 3,284
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Specifications are as in Table 1, columns (1) and 
(4)
Table A2: Robustness Sector Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES totalflow totalflow totalflow totalflow totalflow totalflow
strong executive constraints 0.681** 0.814** 0.884*** 0.716*** 0.673*** 0.825***
(0.294) (0.321) (0.232) (0.268) (0.226) (0.307)
ln(GDPpc) 1.000 0.978
(0.642) (0.673)
GDP pc growth rate -1.491 -2.255
(1.262) (1.475)
ln(population) -0.525 -0.587
(0.897) (1.052)
share of fuel in exports 0.0209*
(0.0110)
share of ores and metals in exports -0.0159
(0.0244)
life expectancy 0.0392
(0.0630)
protection of property rights 0.298***
(0.0806)
EU member 0.315 -0.246
(0.332) (0.367)
openness 0.00650* 0.00684
(0.00378) (0.00507)
trade liberalisation index 0.653*
(0.379)
capital account reform index 1.230***
(0.433)
assassinations 0.0722*
(0.0419)
general strikes 0.0174
(0.0410)
guerrilla warfare 0.0735
(0.145)
major government crises -0.0593
(0.0502)
purges 0.0450
(0.102)
riots 0.0113
(0.0112)
revolutions 0.0707
(0.0684)
anti-government demonstrations -0.0219***
(0.00416)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year/sector fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 41,382 32,204 18,574 43,362 31,322 44,823
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Specifications are as in Table 1 column (1). For description of 
variables see the appendix. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Table A2: Robustness to Controls (Country Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES totalflow totalflow totalflow totalflow totalflow totalflow
strong executive constraints 0.563* 0.812*** 0.871*** 0.596** 0.438** 0.719**
(0.303) (0.310) (0.301) (0.283) (0.192) (0.312)
ln(GDPpc) 0.802 0.679
(0.821) (0.872)
GDP pc growth rate -0.681 -1.302
(1.889) (2.160)
ln(population) -0.599 -0.536
(0.934) (1.024)
share of fuel in exports 0.0199*
(0.0117)
share of ores and metals in exports -0.0395
(0.0376)
life expectancy 0.0778
(0.0810)
protection of property rights 0.412***
(0.137)
EU member 0.292 -0.253
(0.340) (0.385)
openness 0.00629 0.00477
(0.00505) (0.00451)
trade liberalisation index 0.754*
(0.398)
capital account reform index 1.352***
(0.418)
assassinations 0.0501
(0.0415)
general strikes 0.00567
(0.0381)
guerrilla warfare 0.0473
(0.158)
major government crises -0.0217
(0.0490)
purges 0.0946
(0.138)
riots 0.0123
(0.0141)
revolutions 0.103*
(0.0580)
anti-government demonstrations -0.0268***
(0.00576)
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,036 2,814 1,754 4,216 3,019 4,352
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Specifications are as in Table 1 column (4). For description of 
variables see the appendix. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Table A3: Additional Robustness
Panel A: Sector Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Checks and 
Balances Judicial Tenure Post Cold War Net Inflows Exposure
VARIABLES
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
checks and balances index 0.101***
(0.0308)
judges have tenure 0.532***
(0.116)
strong executive constraints 0.809** 0.733** 0.894***
(0.371) (0.286) (0.200)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
sector/year fixed effects yes yes yes yes no
exposure no no no no yes
Observations 44,803 42,306 35,140 45,907 45,937
Panel B: Country Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
checks and balances index 0.116***
(0.0312)
judges have tenure 0.540***
(0.203)
strong executive constraints 0.683* 0.611** 0.770***
(0.381) (0.305) (0.296)
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes no
exposure no no no no yes
Observations 4,300 4,068 3,230 4,551 4,581
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns 
report results from a fixed effects poisson regression. Dependant variable in columns (1) to (3) and (5) is the 
gross investment flows from the Netherlands into the country or country/sector. Dependant variable in column 
(4) is the net investment flow from the Netherlands conditional on the flow being positive. Column (5) uses an 
exposure variable instead of sector/year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Column 
(3) uses only data after 1991.
Table A4: Executive Constraints and Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Investment 
Inflow
Number of 
Industries with 
Inflows
Investment 
Inflow
Number of 
Industries with 
Inflows
xconst = 7 1.160** 0.395*** 1.294** 0.278**
(0.503) (0.120) (0.527) (0.114)
xconst = 6 0.265 0.162* 0.517 0.0401
(0.473) (0.0979) (0.500) (0.0920)
xconst = 5 0.430 0.158* 0.578 0.0509
(0.403) (0.0958) (0.417) (0.0904)
xconst = 4 0.443 -0.0882 0.715 -0.175
(0.530) (0.148) (0.538) (0.137)
xconst = 3 -0.208 -0.144 0.204 -0.207**
(0.468) (0.0996) (0.449) (0.0994)
xconst = 2 1.003** 0.129 1.361*** 0.0388
(0.504) (0.0963) (0.492) (0.0910)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes yes no
sector/year fixed effects yes yes yes no
country fixed effects no no no yes
year fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 45,937 46,846 4,466 4,578
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns report 
results from a fixed effects poisson regression. Dependant variable is the gross investment 
inflow from the Netherlands into the country or country/sector in columns (1) and (3). 
Columns (2) and (4) use the number of industries with a positive inflow. Omitted category is 
xconst=1 and xconst=0. Results do not change when excluding xconst=0. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year.
country levelsector level
Table A5: Two Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
first stage
VARIABLES
strong executive 
constraints
Investment 
Inflow
Number of 
Industries with 
Inflows
Investment 
Inflow
Number of 
Industries with 
Inflows
share of contigious countries 
with strong executive 
constraints 0.442***
(0.0242)
strong executive constraints 
(fitted values) 3.091** 1.592*** 2.191*** 1.470***
(1.284) (0.403) (0.781) (0.388)
country/sector fixed effects no yes yes no no
sector/year fixed effects no yes yes no no
country fixed effects yes no no yes yes
year fixed effects yes no no yes yes
Observations 5,500 45,860 46,769 4,458 4,570
sector level country level
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns report results from fixed effects 
regressions. Columns (2) and (3) report sector level results and columns (4) and (5) report country level results. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Table A6: Executive Constraints and Political Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
xconsthigh -0.508** -0.349* -0.358* -3.238** -2.784* -4.143** 0.410 0.271 0.550**
(0.243) (0.184) (0.190) (1.471) (1.413) (1.863) (0.260) (0.240) (0.205)
xropenhigh -0.0856 1.390 0.149
(0.149) (1.834) (0.321)
xrcomphigh 0.0526 2.763 -0.741**
(0.171) (2.182) (0.324)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 556 556 556 661 661 661 661 661 661
Whithin adj. R-Squared 0.051 0.323 0.324 0.011 0.113 0.120 0.010 0.180 0.200
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns report results from a fixed effects OLS regression. Dependent variable is mid-term political risk evaluation 
by the Belgian risk insurer ONDD in columns (1) to (3), the variance of the IMF growth forecast in columns (4) to (6) and the mean of the growth forecast in columns (7) to (9). The forecasts in 
columns (4) to (9) are from the IMF World Economic Outlook which is published since 1990 and includes forecasts for the two preceding years and six years ahead. The sample is restricted 
to countries that changed level of executive constraints between high and low executive constraints at least once.
variance of IMF forecast mean of IMF forecastrisk insurance evaluation
Table A7: Heterogeneity by Continent
number of transitions
average change in 
growth volatility beliefs
average change in 
mean growth beliefs
Europe 9 -0.0042 0.0020
Africa 8 -0.0040 -0.0025
Latin America and 
the Carribean 10 -0.0038 -0.0026
Asia 6 -0.0030 -0.0047
Table A8: Rent Seeking, Executive Constraints and Investment Inflows
(1) (2)
VARIABLES
Investment 
Inflow
Investment 
Inflow
strong executive constraints 0.0267
(0.141)
strong executive constraints * share 
of politically connected firms 1.266** 4.212***
(0.506) (0.984)
country/sector fixed effects yes yes
sector/year fixed effects yes no
country/year fixed effects no yes
Observations 13,240 13,240
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Both columns report results from a fixed effects poisson 
regression. Dependant variable  is the gross investment inflow from 
the Netherlands into the country/sector. Political connections are 
from Faccio (2006). We use the share of politically connected firms 
in the country which are active in this sector. All explanatory 
Table A9: Sector Heterogeneity in Updating Model
VARIABLES
coefficients on 
estimate of variance
coefficients on 
estimate of mean
Mining and Quarring -147.6 95.63
(97.80) (116.9)
Manufacturing -151.8*** 141.0***
(30.66) (30.47)
Electricity, Gas and Steam -148.1** 175.4**
(64.51) (86.58)
Construction -455.6** 360.6***
(178.8) (139.6)
Wholesale and Retail Trade -106.4*** 83.31**
(26.87) (38.42)
Transportation and Storage -101.8* -16.40
(56.10) (61.33)
Accommodation and Food Services -239.0 86.49
(1,200) (520.5)
Information and Communication -126.8*** 170.0***
(34.52) (45.42)
Finance and Insurance -178.1*** 112.8***
(26.15) (29.72)
Real Estate Activities 95.85 -202.1**
(59.49) (87.34)
Professional, Scientific and Technical 65.06 -59.77
(56.79) (48.42)
Admin. and Support Services -6,425*** 271.1
(1,982) (265.5)
Other Services -317.1 322.0
(233.5) (202.4)
Activities of Households as Employers -50.34 75.01**
(31.94) (37.11)
Extraterritorial Organisations -92.10* 45.10
(54.49) (62.22)
country/sector fixed effects
sector/year fixed effects
Observations
(1)
Investment Inflow
11,054
yes
yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Definitions are 
as in Table 3. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Figure 1: Investment Inflows over Time (Mean Flow)
Note: Graph shows average for countries that were always in strong or weak executive constraints.
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Figure 2: Investment Inflows over Time (Mean Share)
Note: Graph shows average for countries that were always in strong or weak executive constraints.
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Note: Solid line shows coefficients on leads and lags around the adoption date (at 0) of strong executive constraints plus the coefficient on the “strong executive
constraints” dummy from Table A1. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals using the standard deviation of the lead and lag coefficients. Regression is controlling
for country/sector and year/sector fixed effects in a) and country and year fixed effects in b).
Figure 3: Adoption of Strong Executive Constraints
a) sector level b) country level
Figure 4: Executive Constraints and GDPpc Growth
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Figure 5: Executive Constraints, Stability and Foreign Investments
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Note: Graph displays the ln of thr average investment inflows for each country/regime episode on the y-axis. The x-axis gives the average exp. 
variance of productivity growth in each episode. Expectations are calculated using the updating model under the assumption of D=46.
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Figure 6: Strength of Prior and Deviance of the Updating Model
Note: Red lines indicate minimum deviance values on the sector and country level respectively.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Mean Prediction Error by Country
Note: Graph displays esitmated distribution function of the mean linear errors in the reduced form model and the updating
model. Errors are calculated by comparing the actual change of inflows at the country level from weak to strong executive
constraints to the fitted values in the two models. Figure disregards two outliers in the reduced form model.
Figure 8: Sector Heterogeneity
Note: Figure displays regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Coefficients come from a regression as in Table (1), Column (1) in which executive constraints are 
interacted with a set of sector dummies.  Figure reports results on the 15 largest sectors.
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Figure 9: Sector Heterogeneity
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Note: Figure displays regression coefficients from Figure 8 together with scores from the Bribery in Business Sectors report by Transparency 
International. Higher scores mean that the sector is less prone to bribe giving.
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Figure A1: Share of Countries with Strong Executive Constraints
Figure A2: Adoption of High Executive Constraints and UNCTAD Investment Flows
Solid line shows coefficients on leads and lags around the adoption date (at 0) of high executive constraints plus the
coefficient on the “strong executive constraints” dummy. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals using the standard 
deviation of the lead and lag coefficients. Regression is controlling for country and year fixed effects.
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Figure A3: Mean Prediction Error by Continent
Note: Graph displays the mean of the linear errors in the reduced form model estimated in Table 1, Column 4 and the
updating model estimated in Table 3, Column 4. Errors are calculated by comparing the actual change inflows from weak to 
strong executive constraints to the fitted values in the two models.
-200000
-150000
-100000
-50000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
Europe Africa Latin America and the
Carribean
Asia
reduced form model learning model
Construction
Finance and Insurance
ManufacturingElectricity, Gas and Steam
Information and Communication
-5
00
-4
00
-3
00
-2
00
-1
00
re
ac
tio
n 
to
 v
ol
at
ilit
y
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5
transparency international bribe score
Figure A4: Reaction to political risk by sector
Note: Figure reports coefficients from Table A8 which are significant at 90% confidence together with scores from the Bribery in Business 
Sectors report by Transparency international. Higher scores mean that the sector is less prone to bribe giving.
